時(shí)間：2025年3月28日 星期五 15:30-17:30
地點(diǎn)：清華大學(xué)公共管理學(xué)院302會(huì)議室
語(yǔ)言：中文
主題：國(guó)王的盛宴：一項(xiàng)關(guān)于利他性故意忽視與互惠的實(shí)驗(yàn)
The King’s Banquet: An Experiment on Altruistic Wilful Ignorance and Reciprocity
主講人：包特 新加坡南洋理工大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)系長(zhǎng)聘副教授、研究生院助理院長(zhǎng)
主持人：劉生龍 清華大學(xué)公共管理學(xué)院副教授，清華大學(xué)國(guó)情研究院副研究員
點(diǎn)評(píng)人：陳濟(jì)冬 清華大學(xué)公共管理學(xué)院長(zhǎng)聘副教授
張鵬龍 清華大學(xué)公共管理學(xué)院長(zhǎng)聘副教授，清華大學(xué)國(guó)情研究院副研究員
主辦：清華大學(xué)國(guó)情研究院
講座內(nèi)容：
Many studies have shown that people may strategically avoid or ignore costless information to create moral wiggle room and maintain positive social image. In this paper, we explore the possibility that a principal (the King) may deliberately choose “keep me in the dark (KMID)” about his agent’s (the General) opportunistic behavior to avoid punishing her and protect the agent’s social image. Our result shows that around 30% Kings are indeed willing to turn a blind eye to the Generals’ betrayal even without any expectation of doing so may nudge the agent to pay back in the next stage. The fraction increases to more than 50% if the latter can reward the goodwill. Material consequence seems to be a stronger driver of the King’s decision than social image; more than 2/3 of Kings will switch from avoiding the information to receiving the information but pardoning the General if the pardon option is available.
主講人簡(jiǎn)介：
包特，新加坡南洋理工大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)系長(zhǎng)聘副教授、研究生院助理院長(zhǎng)。主要研究領(lǐng)域?yàn)閷?shí)驗(yàn)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)、行為金融和計(jì)算經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)。其研究成果發(fā)表于Management Science, Economic Journal, European Economic Review, Experimental Economics, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control等國(guó)際期刊和《管理世界》《管理科學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)》《經(jīng)濟(jì)研究》《世界經(jīng)濟(jì)》等國(guó)內(nèi)期刊。擔(dān)任Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance和Singapore Economic Review副主編。
